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Introduction
In this paper, we study the equilibria of a vertically di¤erentiated Bertrand duopoly where the timing of moves at the quality stage is endogenised via an extended game with observable delay à la Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) . In particular, we take this standpoint to complement the analysis carried out by Aoki (2003) , in which: 1 variable production costs are nil and quality improvements hinge upon …xed costs, the quality stage is assumed to be either simultaneous or sequential and the timing cannot be decided by …rms and in the sequential case, the leader and follower's roles are predetermined while the choice between high and low quality is endogenous. This yields that the leader will supply a higher quality than the rival's (see Aoki, 2003 , Proposition 2, p. 659).
Here instead we assume as exogenous the location of …rms along the quality spectrum, while endogenising the distribution of roles to be taken at the quality stage through a pre-play stage preceding the quality investment phase. In this respect, our analysis is based on d'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1980) and Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) , according to whom a game is Stackelberg-solvable if there exists a Stackelberg equilibrium that Paretodominates the Nash solution. 1 The early literature on vertical di¤erentiation has largely focussed on simultaneous choices (although describing, amongst other things, the limit properties of the entry process). See Thisse (1979, 1980) , Sutton (1982, 1983) and Motta (1993) , inter alia. Stackelberg play has been investigated in Aoki and Prusa (1997) . 2 The analysis of the same vertically di¤erentied industry under Cournot competition is in Lambertini and Tampieri (2012) , where it is shown that there exists a unique subgame Our analysis consider two alternative cases separately. In the …rst (already considered by Aoki, 2003) , partial market coverage prevails. If so, then from the analysis of the quality stage, there emerges that both …rms' best replies are increasing. This produces two pure-strategy equilibria, both charcterised by sequential play, posing a coordination problem. Additionally, there also exists a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies, whose characterisation reveals that the probability of generating an out-of-equilibrium outcome (that is, committing the mistake of playing simultaneously) is indeed strigtly higher than the probability of playing one of the two Nash equilibria in pure strategies. In the second scenario, we investigate the same issue under full market coverage (not considered by Aoki, 2003) . This reveals that the quality stage has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium at the intersection of dominant strategies where the Nash and Stackelberg solutions coincide, since best reply functions are orthogonal in that stage. This implies that, in the presence of full market coverage, the choice of timing becomes indeed immaterial.
The model
We consider a duopoly market for vertically di¤erentiated products supplied by single-product …rms. The demand side is modelled à la Mussa and Rosen (1978) . There is a continuum of consumers whose types are identi…ed by , uniformly distributed with density equal to one in the interval [ 0 ; 1 ]; with 0 = 1 1, where represents the consumers'marginal willingness to pay for quality. Each consumer is assumed to buy at most one unit of the vertically di¤erentiated good in order to maximise the following surplus function:
perfect equilibrium where sequential play obtains in the quality stage and the low-quality …rm takes the leader's role. To o¤er an alternative persepctive, we depart from Aoki's setup in proposing a game consisting of three stages, in which …rms' identities along the quality ladder are given at the outset. In the …rst stage, …rms choose the timing to be followed in the second stage, where qualities are set, and then in the third stage simultaneous Bertrand competition takes place. The solution concept is the subgame perfect equilibrium by backward induction.
The …rst stage is a pre-play stage à la Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), in which, under complete, symmetric and imperfect information, …rms play a discrete strategy game represented in Matrix 1.
Actions F and S stand for "…rst"or "second", and refers to the choice of roles in the quality stage, while superscripts N , SL, and SF stand for Nash, Stackelberg leader and Stackelberg follower, respectively. If …rms select the same strategy -along the main diagonal -then the second-stage quality game is simultaneous. Conversely, along the secondary diagonal, the quality stage is going to be solved à la Stackelberg.
Results
To begin with, we recollect Aoki The results can be qualitatively assessed by examining Figure 1 , which shows the map of best replies and the isopro…t curves. The Nash equilibrium (point N ) under simultaneous play yields to both …rm L and …rm H a lower pro…t as compared to either of the Stackelberg equilibria (points S L and S H ), so that the following chains of inequalities hold:
Hence, the timing game depicted in Matrix 1 yields two pure-strategy equilibria along the secondary diagonal, according to which …rm is leader. It is noteworthy to point out that, in each equilibrium the follower obtains the highest pro…t. This is perfectly in line with Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), according to which if a …rm has a decreasing (resp., increasing) reaction function, it will prefer to move …rst (resp., second) (see Hamilton and Slutsky, 1990 , Theorem V, p. 38). The foregoing discussion can be summarised in Proposition 1 With Bertrand competition, the three stage game has two pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibria along the secondary diagonal, in which …rms choose to play sequentially at the quality stage.
6 Figure 1 . The map of best replies with partial market coverage.
The multiplicity problem highlighted by the above Proposition also entails that there exists a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium which is worth investigating so as to ascertain the relative probabilities of playing one of the two pure-strategy equilibria along the secondary diagonal of Matrix 1, or instead committing a mistake by generating either outcome along the main diagonal.
Given the a priori symmetry of the model, we can solve the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the …rst stage of the game from the standpoint of …rm i = H; L; whose task is to attach probabilities p i 2 [0; 1] to strategy F and 1 p i to strategy S, respectively, so as to make …rm j 6 = i indi¤erent between its own pure strategies. This implies solving the following equation:
w.r.t. p i , delivering
Using (4), we can quickly estabilish that the probability of playing either
while the probability of playing along the main diagonal is
with
This result holds irrespective of the degree of vertical di¤erentiation to be chosen in the second stage, as long as q H > q L , and implies:
Corollary 2 The mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium at the timing stage reveals that the probability of committing a mistake is strictly higher than the probability of playing either pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, for all admissible pair
The problem of multiple equilibria disappears if full market coverage ob-
tains. In what follows, we retain the set of assumptions introduced above, except that now the market demand for the low-quality good is x L = b
( 1 1). The pro…t functions at the third stage are thus de…ned as
From the …rst order conditions at the market stage, we obtain the following equilibrium prices:
implying the constraint 1 2 (1; 2) : Full market coverage is admissible if and only if the individual of the lowest type 0 obtains a non-negative surplus from the consumption of the low-quality good, i.e., if:
Plugging (10) into (11), the latter turns out to be sati…ed by all
in the admissible range of 1 : This yields the following Lemma:
Lemma 3 Given 1 2 (1; 2) ; full market coverage is admissible for all
We turn now on the quality stage. The relevant pro…t functions are:
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The …rst order conditions for non cooperative pro…t maximisation are:
Given that (16-17) do not allow for a fully analytical characterisation of Nash and Stackelberg equilibria, we investigate the solution of the quality stage through the map of the reaction functions, implicitly determined by the above FOCs. In particular, Bulow et al. (1985) show that the nature of strategic interaction is completely determined by the sign of the partial derivatives of FOCs with respect to the competitor's quality, which indicate the slopes of reaction functions q i (q j ), i; j = H; L; i 6 = j: It is straightforward to check that:
so that each …rm has a dominant strategy to be adopted irrespective of the competitor's quality choice. This also implies that the Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium in the second stage coincide. Hence the timing plays no role in determining the investment in quality both for the H and L …rm, and the …rst stage disappears altogether (equivalently, one can say that, under full coverage, the three-stage game collapses into a two stage game as the choice of roles becomes immaterial). libria obtain -all of them involving sequential play -in pure strategies, so that (ii) the analysis of mixed strategy is informative, as there emerges that committing mistakes is more likely than playing either pure-strategy equilibrium. Alternatively, under full coverage, the multiplicity issue completely vanishes, replaced by unicity of equilibrium at the intersection of dominant strategies.
